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This paper studies free-riding incentives on common environmental resources in an
incomplete information repeated game where abatements are perishable and perfect substi-
tutes. Two contrasting types of perfect Bayesian equilibria emerge: For high discount factors,
or low discount factors but ‘‘pessimistic’’ prior beliefs, the inclusion of incomplete informa-
tion has no impact on the pattern of abatements. Otherwise the countries attempt to use
their private information strategically and the game becomes a war of attrition. This
generates an outcome where the ‘‘pessimistic’’ country unilaterally abates forever, and
another which involves delay until the first abatement if both countries are ‘‘optimistic’’.
Q 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
International environmental resources are typically marked by the problem of
transboundary externalities, absence of property rights, and individual actions of
the countries that are strategic substitutes.2 Static models with these features are
w xof the prisoners’ dilemma type, therefore predict Hardin’s 9 tragedy of commons:
Žeach country will leave it to the others to take costly actions reduce ‘‘greenhouse
.gases’’ or pollution in the common lake that benefit all. Dynamic complete
information models have shown the opposite, notably that the repeated play of the
game can alleviate the free riding problem considerably through the possibility of
retaliations.3 This paper presents a dynamic game with incomplete information
about valuations, an important aspect missing in the theoretical literature on
transboundary pollution problems.
The importance of private information about, for instance, the relative weight of
environmental problems in governments’ agendas, or the private benefits and costs
1Financial support from the Beijer Institute for presentation of this paper at the research workshop
in Arusha is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Karl-Goran Maler for advice and two anonymous referees¨ ¨
for helpful criticisms and suggestions. Remaining errors and mistakes are mine.
2 Loosely, individual actions are strategic substitutes if best reply functions have negative slopes. In
the context of the problem of pollution control, strategic substitutability implies that a country’s optimal
w xreaction to an increase in the other country’s abatement is to decrease its own. See Bulow et al. 2 for
further details.
3Among a number of recent papers using a dynamic framework to study the problem of transbound-
w xary pollution, we can cite Dockner and Long 4 who show near optimality of the steady state pollution
w xlevel in a Markov perfect equilibrium if the players are patient enough and Martin et al. 12 studying
Ž . w xpolicy impacts of various schemes on asymmetric countries. Felder and Rutherford 5 explore the
w xeconomic consequences of unilateral cutbacks of CO emissions. Maler 11 applies a repeated game¨2
framework to quantify the high payoffs from cooperation in the context of the European acid rain game
w xand discusses other noncooperative formulations as well. See also Maler 10 for a cooperative approach¨
to the European acid rain game.
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of abatement stems from its potentially strategic use. Countries may choose actions
or pass legislations in order to conceal their valuations.4 The inclusion of incom-
plete information thus enlarges the set of strategies and generates new possibili-
ties. A high-valuation country can choose a pure defection strategy that imitates
the behavior of a low-valuation country, or it can abate and reveal its valuation. A
pure defection strategy can be beneficial if it induces abatements from other
countries, but all are worse off if none abates. On the other hand, the consequence
of revealing a high valuation is that the country cannot credibly threaten to defect
in succeeding periods. As the analysis shows, the binary decision as whether or not
to reveal valuation information has more important consequences than the deci-
sion on how much to abate in a given period. Using a dynamic two-country model
of transboundary pollution, we identify potential outcomes and characterize the
corresponding patterns of abatements as perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies.
We provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for a high-valuation country’s
pure defection. The analysis also generates predictions as to the identities of the
contributors and occurrence of delay until the first abatement.
This paper adopts a noncooperative approach to transboundary pollution; it is
therefore closely related to the literature on private provision of public goods. The
Ž . Ž .pollutants abatements have all the typical characteristics of public bads goods .
The ‘‘private provision’’ aspect, on the other hand, stems from the lack of an
international ‘‘police force’’ to enforce agreements. Countries must provide abate-
ments noncooperatively, as a public good is provided through the private contribu-
tions of self-interested individuals. Three types of inefficiencies are emphasized in
the literature on private provision of public goods. The standard free-rider problem
observed in static contexts generates the first type of inefficiency: strategic substi-
tutability of individual contributions leads to a low level of total contributions.5
The second inefficiency takes the form of delayed contributions. It arises in
dynamic settings with incomplete information and forward-looking strategic behav-
ior.6 A third type of inefficiency arises also in dynamic settings in the form of total
contributions even lower than predicted by static models. Such an equilibrium
outcome involves no delay but either a few number of contributors or many
w xcontributors with very low individual contributions. Fershtman and Nitzan 6 have
shown this in a dynamic model assuming complete information and continuous
contributions which accumulate over time.
We show that under specific conditions the infinitely repeated game with a
Ž .perishable public good abatement of pollution exhibits the three types of ineffi-
ciency mentioned above if valuations are private knowledge. Our model generates
Ža rich class of predictions regarding the link between initial data prior beliefs,
potential valuations of countries, and their degree of patience as represented by
4 w xThe national case studies in the March 1993 issue of Global En¨ironmental Change 7 reveal various
indications of this information problem, including concealing of reports by national environmental study
groups.
5 w xSee, for example, Palfrey and Rosenthal 13 for a recent treatment of the classical free-rider
problem in static contexts.
6 The analysis of this outcome is closely related to the war of attrition games, bargaining under
Ž w x. Žincomplete information see for example Chatterjee and Samuelson 3 and reputation Kreps and
w x.Wilson 9 . The first paper to introduce dynamics and delay costs in a noncooperative public good game
w xis Bliss and Nalebuff 1 but their analysis is limited to a discrete public good and the game terminates
at the provision date.
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. Žthe discount factor and the properties of potential outcomes efficiency, identities
.of the contributors, and occurrence of delay until first abatement is observed . This
stems from the flexible nature of the constituent game; for some values of the
parameters the constituent game turns into a chicken game, for some others, into a
prisoners’ dilemma. As expected, total abatements under these two types of
constituent games evolve quite differently. The results and the contents of the
paper are summarized below.
Section II presents a repeated game that starts under incomplete information
with two potential types for the two countries. One type never abates, the other has
an environmental valuation that exceeds abatement costs for some range of
abatement levels. In general, the pattern of abatements in the overall game
depends on the expected outcome of the potential subgame played under complete
information. We make the standard assumption that in this subgame a ‘‘focal
equilibrium’’ is played with symmetric and efficient payoffs subject to the
subgame-perfection constraint. We then show that the perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium of the overall game may change dramatically as a function of these focal
equilibrium payoffs which, in turn, depend on the discount factor. Equilibrium
characterization, presented in Section III, reveals that for discount factors not too
low the inclusion of incomplete information has no impact on the pattern of
abatements, yielding a separating equilibrium in the beginning. Though this result
Ž .may not be surprising because it is in the spirit of the folk theorem , it provides
insights regarding the conditions under which the countries will act cooperatively
forever no matter their prior beliefs about the valuation of their opponents.
Ž .In Section IV we show that the necessary but not sufficient condition for the
overall game to have a war of attrition outcome is a low discount factor. If the
countries put much weight on their actual welfares, or, to use a public choice
interpretation, if each government believes it is unlikely to govern in the next
period, then the evolution of abatements depends critically on prior beliefs.
Interestingly, with ‘‘impatient but pessimistic’’ governments the war of attrition is
avoided. For other ranges of prior beliefs the inclusion of incomplete information
generates an outcome exhibiting all three types of inefficiency mentioned earlier.
In the resulting war of attrition game, the conceding country is the loser and abates
unilaterally, while the winner thereafter chooses a pure defection strategy. This
result highlights the fact that with incomplete information, more optimistic prior
beliefs can actually intensify the countries’ incentives to free ride and therefore
lead to inefficiencies even in a repeated game setting. An interesting subclass of
this outcome emerges when the discount factor is low and prior beliefs are
asymmetric: With probability one, one country starts abating immediately and
forever, while the other country’s behavior is parasitic. Section V contains conclud-
ing remarks and interpretations of the model.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a two-country dynamic game of transboundary pollution where
Ž . Ž .pollution its reduction is assumed a ‘‘Samuelsonian public bad good .’’ The two
countries, A and B, are each endowed with an identical private abatement
Ž .technology represented by a cost function, C Q where Q denotes abatement.
There are two basic types of countries. A type-L country never abates, presumably
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because its valuation is too low. The other type, called type H, has a high valuation
for the environment so that in a range of Q its marginal utility exceeds marginal
cost of abatement. Types are private knowledge. We make the following standard
assumption:
Ž . Ž .A1 The utility function of type H, U Q , is strictly concave and increasing
Ž .and the cost function C Q is strictly convex and increasing. Furthermore, we have
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .U 0 s C 0 s 0 and lim U9 Q ) lim C9 Q ) 0.Q ª 0 Q ª 0
This simple partial equilibrium setting can be derived from a more elaborate
model in which abatement costs would be explicitly accounted for by the foregone
benefit of pulling resources away from their alternative uses. The countries have
the same discount factor, 0 - d - 1, and their planning horizon is infinite. We let
Ž .p s prob country i is of type H , for i s A, B. These probabilities are commoni
knowledge. Given this basic structure of the model, we shall focus on the behavior
of the type-H countries, analytically the interesting case.
In each period, the countries play a constituent game where their action sets are
Ž .decomposed into two sequential moves see Fig. 1 : First, the countries decide
Ž .simultaneously on whether or not to abate participation strategy , and observe the
resulting outcome. Next, the countries who decided to abate decide on how much
Ž .to abate abatement strategy . Pollution is curbed by the total realized abatement
and the game proceeds to the next period.7 Since a type-L country never abates, a
participation with a positive abatement level, if observed, is a clear-cut signal that
the country is of type H. But if no abatement is observed, a type-H country gets a
w xpayoff of zero. Formally, the range of a mixed participation strategy r is 0, 1 fori
i s A, B. The realization of r is denoted r . If a country realizes r s 1, itsˆ ˆi i i
abatement strategy Q may take any value in Rq. Clearly, r s 0 is associated withˆi i
FIGURE 1
7The first justification for this decomposition is technical. It allows us to study the decision-making
process sequentially: a binary participation decision and then the contribution decision. This is
technically useful because dealing with randomizations over a binary participation choice when
countries hesitate between participation and defection is much easier than studying randomizations
over a continuum of contribution strategies. The second justification is rather intuitive. As explained
Ž .below, the decision to participate i.e., deciding to abate is a crucial factor affecting the evolution of the
game because it reveals the type of the corresponding country. Treating participation strategies
separately highlights this leakage of information.
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Q s 0. Since participation precedes abatement, the domain of Q is restricted toi i
the possible realization of the participation strategy.
We close this section with formal definitions of the equilibrium concept and
t Ž t t 4  t t 4.strategies in the overall game. Let a s r , Q ; r , Q be the observedˆ ˆA A B B
actions in period t, and define the history of the play at period t by ht s
Ž 1 2 ty1.a , a , . . . , a . In the overall game, a mixed participation strategy for country i
is a sequence of maps r t, one for each period t, from possible histories ht intoi
w x t  420, 1 . Similarly, an abatement strategy for the overall game maps h = 0, 1 into
Rq, for each t. These strategies may convey type-related information. At the
beginning of each period, the countries use their opponent’s previous participation
strategies to update their beliefs according to Bayes’ rule in the obvious way.
t  4 w x ty1Country i’s belief in period t is a function p ; t ª 0, 1 such that, given p ,yi i
r ty1, and r ty1,i i
1 if r s s 1 for any s F t ;¡ ŷi
ty1 ty1t ~ p 1 y rŽ .p s yi yiyi sif r s 0 for all s - t .ŷity1 ty1 ty1¢p 1 y r q 1 y pŽ . Ž .yi yi yi
Beliefs are thus required to be consistent with strategies and satisfy the ‘‘never
Ždissuaded once convinced’’ condition. Observe that p is updated to and willyi
.remain at one in the period in which the other country abates. If, on the other
hand, no abatement is observed, a slightly more complex updating rule is used
along the equilibrium path. Note that rational countries can predict accurately the
mixed strategy of their opponent along the equilibrium path. Let V t and V t denoteA B
respectively A’s and B’s expected discounted payoffs as viewed from period t. We
require the strategies in the overall game to form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Ž .PBE .
 tU tU4A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a pair of strategy sequences r , Q andA A
 tU tU4 tr , Q of type-H countries such that, for all t, given the history h andB B
 t 4  t 4consistent beliefs p and p ,A B
V t r tU , QtU , r tU , QtU G V t r t , Qt , r tU , QtU for all r t , Qt 1Ž . 4  4  4  4  4Ž . Ž .A A A B B A A A B B A A
V t r tU , QtU , r tU , QtU G V t r tU , QtU , r t , Qt for all r t , Qt . 2Ž . 4  4  4  4  4Ž . Ž .B A A B B B A A B B B B
 1 4  1 4If all the elements of the sequences r and r are zeros and ones, we have aA B
PBE in pure participation strategies. Basically, the PBE concept requires that
Žstrategies be sequentially rational optimal given beliefs and the history of the
.game and that beliefs be updated according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
III. THE POTENTIAL SUBGAMES AND INFORMATION STRUCTURES
In this section, we study the equilibria of the constituent game and of some
special cases of the overall game. These elements are brought together in Section
IV where we present our main result. Special information structures of the overall
 4game correspond to complete information about types, that is, p g 0, 1 . Amongi
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the four possible combinations of these extreme prior beliefs, the case where both
Ž .countries are known as type L p s 0 is uninteresting. We therefore focus on thei
remaining three combinations of prior beliefs and analyze the corresponding
Ž .repeated game or any of its subgame .
The game in which it is common knowledge that country A is of type H and
country B is of type L has a trivial solution: Country A abates forever with
HL  Ž . Ž .4unilateral contributions given by Q s argmax U Q y C Q , which is uniqueQ
Ž .by A1 . We have the same outcome in the opposite case where the countries’ types
are reversed: Type H abates QHL forever. As we show in the sequel, the overall
game has equilibria in which one country unilaterally abates forever. The subgames
Žthat have this equilibrium outcome are called the AN game or the NA game A for
.abating, N for not abating , depending on whether it is country A or B who
unilaterally abates forever. Finally, the overall game played by two type-H coun-
Ž .tries under complete information p s 1 , or any subgame of the overall gamei
having this information structure, is called the AA game.
Ž .Consider now the static one-shot play of the constituent game where it is
common knowledge that both countries are of type H. Country i’s objective is
given by
max r r U Q q Q q 1 y r U Q y C Q q 1 y r r U Q .Ž . Ž . Ž .Ž . Ž . Ž .½ 5i j i j j i i i j j
 4r , Qi i
3Ž .
This payoff function reflects the fact that, ex ante, the other country’s strategies
Žare unknown each country has to anticipate the other country’s participation and
.abatement . Hence, from A’s viewpoint, r can be interpreted as the probability ofB
B’s participation. Notice also that individual abatements are strategic substitutes in
the sense that the optimal abatement of country i decreases as country j increases
its abatement. This is clear from the negative slope of the best reply functions
U Ž .Q Q represented in Fig. 2.i j
FIGURE 2
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The strongly symmetric structure of the constituent game ensures, along with the
Ž . Ž .properties of the functions U Q and C Q , a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium
HH  Ž HH .in which both countries participate and abate Q s argmax U Q q Q yQ
Ž .4 HHC Q . The low payoffs corresponding to symmetric abatements Q , denoted P
in Fig. 3, represent the first type of inefficiency in the private provision of pollution
reduction. As a reference point, it is useful to determine the optimum level of
abatement with symmetric contributions. These solve the following problem:
max 2U Q q Q y C Q y C Q .Ž . Ž . Ž .1 2 1 2
 4Q , Q1 2
The unique symmetric solution denoted QF satisfies the first-order condition
F F F HHŽ . Ž .2U9 2Q s C9 Q , from which it follows that Q ) Q . We denote by P the
Ž F . Ž F .symmetric payoff U 2Q y C Q . Thus the lower and upper bounds of total
symmetric payoffs for the complete information case are respectively 2 P and 2 P.
We can now proceed with the analysis of the repeated game between two type-H
countries under complete information. This is the AA game. From the literature
on repeated games we know that the AA game has subgame perfect equilibria
Ž .SPE in which type-H countries reach higher payoffs via the penalty of Nash
Žreversion. In fact, any individually rational and feasible average payoff up to the
.first-best can be supported by SPE strategies provided that d is sufficiently high.
Ž . Ž Ž . Ž .. < Ž . 4We shall denote by P d s P d , P d P d G P, i s A, B the set of feasi-A B i
ble and individually rational average payoff pairs where each individual payoff is
Ž .higher than the static equilibrium payoff P. The set P d is never empty; it gets
Ž .  4larger as d ª 1, but P 0 s P, P is a singleton.
A well-known problem in repeated games is the abundance of SPE. There is no
agreed-upon way of choosing between the equilibria; most authors focus exclusively
on an efficient equilibrium, usually a symmetric one, yet some versions of the
‘‘renegotiation proofness’’ concept used by a number of authors imply that the
FIGURE 3
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equilibrium must be inefficient. Here we adopt the former approach widely used in
 Ž . Ž .4the literature on repeated games. Let P d , P d denote the highest symmetric
pair of payoffs that can be supported as a SPE outcome, given the discount factor.
We assume that
Ž .A2 in the AA game, the countries play the symmetric SPE strategies
Ž .associated with the highest attainable payoffs P d .
Ž . w ŽMore precisely, each country in the AA game abates Q d maximizing U Q q
Ž .. Ž .x Ž .Q d y C Q r 1 y d under the subgame-perfection constraint
U UP d G 1 y d U Q Q q Q d y C Q Q q dP , 4Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Ž . Ž .Ž . Ž .
U 8Ž . Ž . Ž .where Q Q is the one-period static best reply to Q d . A deviation to the best
U UŽ Ž . Ž .. Ž Ž ..static reply yields in the actual period the payoff U Q Q q Q d y C Q Q ,
but in all future periods the path of abatements is reversed to the static Nash
equilibrium where individual payoffs are P. Note that the maximum symmetric
SPE payoff pair is a point on the payoff possibilities frontier in Fig. 3, and that the
Ž .payoff possibilities frontier shrinks as d decreases. If 4 holds, no country will
9Ž . Ž .deviate from the abatement strategy Q d supporting the payoffs P d . A first
Ž .implication of A2 on the equilibria of the overall game is stated below.
PROPOSITION 1. The o¨erall game switches immediately to the AA game no matter
Ž HL .the priors and the discount factor if P G U Q .
Proof. P is the lowest attainable symmetric SPE payoff in the AA game, while
Ž HL .U Q is the payoff corresponding to a pure defection strategy when the other
HL Ž HL .country makes its optimal unilateral abatement Q . Thus if P G U Q , there is
no incentive to conceal type information; both countries participate in the first
period to reap the higher payoffs of the AA game. Q.E.D.
Throughout the rest of the paper we shall assume that the condition in
Proposition 1 does not hold. That is,
Ž . Ž HL .A3 P - U Q .
Ž .Actually, A3 corresponds to the case represented in Fig. 3. The constituent game
becomes a chicken game: Both countries like the mutual participation payoff P
better than mutual defection, but each is strictly better off if it defects while the
Ž .other country abates unilaterally. A3 is also a necessary but not sufficient
condition for private information about valuations to be used strategically in order
8 Ž .In fact, the symmetric and efficient payoffs in A2 can be replaced by any focal equilibrium. The
Ž .argument in favor of the countries’ being attracted by the focal point described in A2 is the
equal-sharing principle, quite an influential force in social contexts. Also, the payoff functions of two
type-H countries are perfectly symmetric, and among the symmetric equilibria, both countries would
Ž .prefer the one with highest attainable payoffs P d , given the discount factor that sustains this outcome
Ž .as an SPE. Note that A2 does not imply that the equilibrium is cooperative; all cooperation must be
Ž .self-enforcing, as required by the subgame-perfection constraint 4 . There is strong evidence for the
power of focal points in determining outcomes, even in isolated bargaining experiments where forces
w xfavoring self-interested behavior are the most effective. See Roth 14 for a review of experiments that
illustrate this phenomenon.
9 w xMaler 12 estimates the minimum discount factors required to sustain a given level of cooperation¨
Ž Ž . .in the context of the European acid rain this corresponds to the minimum d that makes 4 binding .
He also presents predictions about the countries that are most likely to deviate from a European sulfur
emission agreement.
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to extract abatements from the other country. The when and why of this strategic
role of information are explored in Section IV.
Finally, consider an asymmetric information case, say, the AN game where B is
Ž 1 1 w ..the informed country corresponding prior beliefs are p s 1, p g 0, 1 . TheA B
PBE of this game is characterized below.
Ž . Ž . Ž .PROPOSITION 2. Consider the AN game and assume A1 , A2 , and A3 .
U UHLŽ . Ž . Ž .  4  4  4i If P d G U Q , the PBE is characterized by r s 1, 1, . . . , Q si i
 Ž . Ž . 4  4Q d , Q d , . . . , with corresponding belief sequences gï en by p si
 1 4p , 1, 1, . . . for i s A, B. Out-of-equilibrium-path beha¨ior is as follows: Ifi
country i de¨iates to r1 s 0, country j abates its best reply QHL until r s 1 isˆi i
obser̈ ed. If a de¨iation occurs in period t ) 2, then the static equilibrium with
abatement le¨els QHH is played fore¨er.
UHLŽ . Ž . Ž .  4ii If P d - U Q , the PBE is characterized by the following strategies: r sA
 4  U 4  HL HL 4  U4  U4  41, 1, . . . , Q s Q , Q , . . . , and r s Q s 0, 0, . . . . Any de¨iationA B B
of country A is ignored, while if country B de¨iates to r s 1 in any period, p isB B
Ž .updated to one in that period and the strategies described in case i are played.
Ž .Proof. i There is no incentive to deviate from the prescribed strategies in the
HLŽ . Ž .first period because P d G U Q . Hence, both countries choose r s 1 in the
first period and the overall game switches to the AA game where the strategies
described in the proposition are subgame perfect by definition. Hence, they are
perfect Bayesian as well.
Ž .ii Since both types of country B play r s 0 forever, A’s strategy as described in
the proposition is a best reply. Country A will not deviate because this merely
Ž .decreases its payoff its deviations are ignored . Nor will type H of B deviate from
 U4  4r s 0, 0, . . . because otherwise the game collapses into the AA game where,B
HLŽ . Ž . Ž .by A2 , the symmetric outcome yields P d - U Q . Thus the strategies in
Proposition 2 are best replies, and beliefs are consistent. Q.E.D.
Exchanging the positions of the two countries leads to the NA game whose
equilibria are exactly as described in Proposition 2. The intuition for why the
Ž .informed country never abates in the equilibrium of case ii of Proposition 2 is
HLŽ . Ž .quite simple: because its type cannot be verified and P d - U Q , the in-
formed country benefits from its informational advantage and prefers concealing
Ž .its type. The threat ‘‘I will stop contributing if you the informed country do not
Ž .contribute as well’’ is empty, because there is a probability however small that the
Ž .informed country is of type L. Hence under the conditions stated in case ii of
Proposition 2, the uninformed country is bound to abate forever. This outcome
corresponds to the third type of inefficiency mentioned in the Introduction: though
abatements start immediately in period one, their volume is even lower than
predicted by the static, complete information version of the model.
IV. THE OVERALL INCOMPLETE INFORMATION GAME
In this section we characterize the potential outcomes of the overall game in
terms of the basic parameters: the discount factor, prior beliefs of the countries,
and the payoff structure of the constituent abatement game. Before proceeding
with the analysis, we mention some interpretations of the discount factor that are
particularly appealing in this context. d is usually thought of as representing pure
time preference, that is, d s eyrD where D is the length of each period of
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commitment and r is the rate of time preference, or the interest rate in applica-
tions. d increases as r andror D decrease. D can be thought of as the length of a
Ž .planning period during which the government’s strategies remain fixed while r
would be much affected by public choice considerations as the relative importance
of other short-term objectives, employment, external balance, and so on. Another
related interpretation of d is the probability of continuing from one period to the
next, i.e., the government’s prospect of remaining in office for another period. Our
results can easily be reformulated using the relationships between d and the length
of a period, rate of time preference, and probability of repeating the constituent
game.
Since countries are diverse with respect to their rates of time preference, it is
worth discussing briefly the impact of allowing for differential discount factors.
This modification has a straightforward, predictable qualitative implication on the
Ž .results. The symmetric SPE payoff P d corresponding to the AA game should be
 Ž . Ž .4replaced by min P d , P d . This is so because it is the behavior of theB A
‘‘impatient’’ country that becomes binding in supporting the high cooperative
payoffs as a SPE outcome. An impatient country puts relatively more weight on its
actual payoffs, therefore it has stronger incentives for a one-period defection from
the cooperative path.
At this stage of the analysis we have to determine the necessary conditions for
existence of a free-riding advantage generated purely by the incomplete informa-
tion problem. We start with the following proposition which states that ‘‘pure
defection forever’’ cannot be an equilibrium outcome if at least one country is of
type H.
Ž .  4  4  4PROPOSITION 3. Under A1 , the strategy r s Q s 0, 0, . . . for i s A, B isi i
not a PBE strategy of a type-H country.
The proof is straightforward. Discounted payoffs of a type-H country associated
with these strategies are zero, thus a deviation in any period enhances welfare. This
Ž . Ž . Ž .is so because, by A1 , there exists a range of abatements such that U9 Q ) C9 Q .
Proposition 3 thus rules out the strategy pair ‘‘pure defection forever.’’ We will
show in Proposition 5 a stronger result, that an abatement will be observed with
probability one at some finite date. That is, the overall game must eventually reach
one of the three potential subgames among which the AN and NA game exhibit
unilateral free riding through pure defection strategies. Note, however, that even if
Ž .we assume A2 , which stipulates that countries play the most efficient and
symmetric equilibrium in the AA game, the overall game will not necessarily
collapse immediately into the AA game. The crucial parameters in this respect are
explicit below in the expressions of the expected discounted payoffs of A and B,
respectively.10
1 1 1 1 AA 1 1 ANV s r r p V q 1 y r p VŽ .A A B B A B B A
1 1 1 NA 1 1 2q 1 y r r p V q 1 y r p d V 5Ž .Ž . Ž .A B B A B B A
10As mentioned in Section II, the strategy of the type L is known, so we need only present the
strategies and payoffs of type H when defining and analyzing equilibria. This does not imply that the
countries in the game are known to be of type H, but rather that the behavior of type L is already
transparent.
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1 1 1 1 AA 1 1 NAV s r r p V q 1 y r p VŽ .B B A A B A A B
1 1 1 AN 1 1 2q 1 y r r p V q 1 y r p d V . 6Ž .Ž . Ž .B A A B A A B
The bracket following r1 in the expression of V 1 represents country i’s expectedi i
Ž 1.discounted payoff from participating, and that following 1 y r , from defecting ini
period one. Combinations of A and N appear in the superscripts of V to denotei
country i’s expected discounted payoff from the three potential subgames, AA,
AN, and NA. For example, if both countries realize participation, the game is
Ž .played under complete information with average payoffs P d . Thus
P dŽ .
AA AAV s V s 7Ž .A B 1 y d
are the discounted payoffs if both countries start abating immediately. This is a
Žrandom event when mixed participation strategies are used we omit the arguments
. Ž . Ž .of the strategies for conciseness . As 5 and 6 show, the probability of switching
to the AA game is r1 r1 p 1 from the perspective of A, and r1 r1p 1 from theA B B B A A
perspective of B. If A participates and observes no participation from B, then the
game collapses into the AN game; B free rides indefinitely. A’s discounted payoffs
in this case are
HL HLU Q y C QŽ . Ž .
ANV s . 8Ž .A 1 y d
On the other hand, the opposite outcome in which A becomes the free rider yields
U QHLŽ .
NAV s . 9Ž .A 1 y d
We have V AN s V NA s V AN by symmetry.11 Note that revealing a high valuationA A B
once after the other country has done so cannot be optimal because an immediate
joint switching to the AA game avoids discounting, thus strictly increases payoffs.
Finally, if no abatement occurs the game proceeds one period ahead. A’s expected
discounted payoffs are d V 2 and B’s are d V 2.A B
Let us now define d , a critical value of the discount factor byc
HLP d s U Q . 10Ž . Ž .Ž .c
That is, if d s d , the highest symmetric per-period payoff that can be supported asc
Ž HL .a SPE outcome in the AA game is just equal to U Q , the static payoff from
pure defection while the other country abates unilaterally. In terms of Fig. 3, recall
that the payoff possibility frontier shrinks as d falls. At precisely d s d thec
Ž HL . Ž .symmetric point on this frontier coincides with payoffs U Q . A3 ensures the
Ž .existence of d g 0, 1 . We can now proceed to characterize the PBE of thec
overall game, starting with equilibria in pure participation strategies.
11 The PBE strategy profiles of the subgames AA, AN, and NA can each be thought of as a
self-enforcing agreement on emissions reduction; then the overall game can be interpreted as a model
of negotiation. We discuss this interpretation briefly in Section V.
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Ž . Ž . Ž .PROPOSITION 4. Assume A1 , A2 and A3 .
Ž . Ž .Case i : d G d . Play in the o¨erall game switches immediately to the AA game.c
Ž .  U14The corresponding PBE strategies are gï en in case i of Proposition 2: r si
U1 1 4  4  Ž . Ž . 4  41, 1, 1, . . . , Q s Q d , Q d , . . . and beliefs form the sequence p si i
 1 4p , 1, 1, . . . for i s A, B.i
Ž . Ž .Case ii : d - d . There exists a critical region of prior beliefs defined by thec
1Ž . w x w x Ž .function p d : 0, d ª 0, 1 , such that, if p F p d , the equilibrium is as describedc i
1 1Ž . Ž .in case i of Proposition 2. On the other hand, if p F p d - p , then the followingi j
strategies constitute the unique PBE:
 U14  1U4  4Country i: r s Q s 0, 0, . . .i i
 U14  4  1U4  HL HL 4Country j: r s 1, 1, . . . , Q s Q , Q , . . . .j j
 4  1 1 4  4The corresponding belief sequences are gï en by p s p , p , . . . and p si i i j
 1 4p , 1, 1, . . . . Country j’s de¨iations are ignored, whereas country i’s de¨iation toj
r s 1 in any period leads immediately to the AA game where countries follow the SPE
strategies described in Proposition 2.
1 Ž .Finally, if p ) p d for i s A, B, no PBE in pure participation strategies exists.i
Proof. Clearly, if the game has an undominated AN, NA, or a AA outcome that
occurs through the play of pure participation strategies, then that outcome is
bound to occur in period one. Hence, if dominated strategies are ruled out, delay
may occur only through the play of mixed participation strategies. The proofs of
Ž . Ž .the cases i and ii consist of deriving the best reply functions and then using
these functions to construct the PBE presented in the Proposition.
Ž .  1 4  4i Consider A’s best reply to r s 1, 1, . . . . A has two choices in pureB
strategies in the first period: The first is to play r1 s 1. If B too reveals that it is ofA
Ž .type H, we are in the AA game where average symmetric payoffs are P d . Second,
Ž 1 .country A can also choose to mimic type L r s 0 in period one, and then revealA
its type or not in the second period after observing B’s strategy, once it becomes
 2 4  4the informed country. That is, A can play r s 0, 0, . . . if B turns out to be ofA
 2 4  4type H, and r s 1, 1, . . . otherwise. This strategy is the best alternative to theA
first. Comparing these two pure strategy options leads at once to
1 HL 1 HL HLp P d y U Q q 1 y p 1 y d U Q y C Q G 0, 11Ž . Ž . Ž .Ž . Ž . Ž .Ž .Ž .B B
which states the condition under which A should prefer the first option, and thus
 14  4 Ž .r s 1, 1, . . . for i s A, B form a PBE. Clearly, 11 holds no matter the valuei
1 Ž .of p if d G d , which implies the result in case i by symmetry of the countries.B c
HLŽ . Ž . Ž .ii Consider now the case d - d . Since P d y U Q - 0, the left hand sidec
1Ž . Ž . Ž . w xof 11 is decreasing in p . Define the schedule p d by the function p d : 0, dB c
1w x Ž . Ž .ª 0, 1 , such that 11 holds with equality if p s p d . Given d - d , we obtainB c
1Ž . Ž . Ž .the equilibrium in case i if p F p d . Inspection of 11 reveals that for the casei
1 1Ž .of asymmetric priors, p F p d - p , the strategies described in the propositioni j
Ž .  1U4are mutually best replies. 11 holds for country j who therefore chooses r sj
 41, 1, . . . no matter the strategy of country i. Given this strategy of j, the best reply
U1 1 4  4 Ž .of i is to set r s 0, 0, . . . because p d - p . The postulated sequences ofi j
beliefs are consistent with the strategies, and no country has any incentive to
deviate given what happens off the equilibrium path. Finally, the nonexistence of a
1Ž .pure concession strategy equilibrium if p d - p for i s A, B can be checkedi
Ž .similarly making use of 11 and Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
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To sum up and sharpen this result, with probability one, the countries reach the
Ž .AA game without delay in either one of the following two cases. i the discount
Ž . Ž .factor is high d G d , or ii the discount factor is low but both prior beliefs doc
not exceed a critical level associated with this discount factor. The inclusion of
Ž .incomplete information has no impact on the pattern of abatements in cases i and
Ž .ii , and countries obtain the high, cooperative, and symmetric payoffs from the
Ž .beginning of the overall game. Hence, besides condition A3 , a low discount factor
is also necessary but not sufficient for the strategic use of private environmental
valuations. Very asymmetric prior beliefs coupled with low discount factors may
lead to the AN or NA game where the country with pessimistic prior beliefs
concedes immediately and abates unilaterally in all future periods. Even if unilat-
eral indefinite defection is individually the first-best outcome, the pessimistic
country gives in and abates unilaterally. As in Proposition 2, this outcome exhibits
the third form of inefficiency in the private supply of public goods: There is no
Ž HL .delay but total per-period abatements in the AN or NA game Q are lower than
total abatements in the static play of the complete information constituent game
Ž HH .2Q .
Another interesting outcome arises if both countries are impatient but none is
pessimistic in the sense described above. In fact, Proposition 5 below shows that
increasing the countries’ optimism may intensify the problem even in a repeated
game setting. However, an abatement will surely be observed at some finite date T
if at least one country has a high valuation for the environment.
1Ž . Ž . Ž .PROPOSITION 5. Assume A1 ] A3 . Let d - d and p d F p - 1 for i sc i
A, B. A finite integer T ) 1 and a unique PBE exist such that completely mixed
Ž tU4  tU4.participation strategies r , r are played for t - T as long as no participation isA B
obser̈ ed. Abatements start at date T with probability one, and the PBE participation
strategies for t G T are pure and remain constant.12
Proposition 5 highlights the conditions under which the equilibrium outcome of
the repeated game may involve delay until first abatement is observed: Condition
Ž .A3 must hold, the countries must discount heavily future payoffs, and they must
be optimistic as to the prospect of extracting abatements from their opponents.
Along the equilibrium path, the countries revise their beliefs and put more weight
on participation as the game proceeds without any abatement. Eventually, if
abatements have not yet started, these beliefs fall below a critical level and a pure
participation strategy is played. Of course, abatements may start earlier as a result
of mixing. In each period along this equilibrium path, the expected payoff from
participation equals the expected payoff from pure defection, given the other
country’s random participation strategy. That is, each randomization is uniquely
determined by the necessity of making type H of the other country indifferent
between participation and defection. The realized outcome may exhibit all three
types of inefficiencies in the private provision of public goods.
The reason why the equilibrium path involves initially the play of completely
mixed participation strategies is that each country is uncertain as to the prospect of
obtaining the potential benefits of an everlasting pure defection. When countries
hold optimistic beliefs about each other it is worthwhile to hold out and try
extracting abatements from the opponent. Though a pure unilateral defection is
12 The proof is available from the author upon request.
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individually the best outcome, mutual defection is the worst. As a result, countries
hesitate between pure defection and pure participation. The outcome would
change dramatically if one country were informed that the other is of type H; as in
the outcome described in Proposition 2, the informed country would know the
HLŽ . Ž .gains from defecting forever, which, if P d - U Q , are superior to those it
obtains by participating and revealing its type. Consequently, the overall game
collapses into the AN or NA game where participation strategies are pure, and the
country identified as type H abates forever. Its threat to stop abating is not
credible because the informed country’s type cannot be verified. Also in the overall
game played under two-sided incomplete information, unilateral free-riding threats
or commitments at the beginning of the game are not credible and are eliminated
by the PBE concept.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Countries are diverse with respect to their environmental valuations, develop-
ment plans, and short- and long-term goals. The scope and ambition of these plans
or the place of environmental issues in governments’ agendas can hardly be
assessed from outside. Such private information has a potentially strategic use. This
paper studies in a fully dynamic framework when and why informational problems
are likely to cause serious inefficiencies in the control of international environmen-
tal resources. It uses an infinitely repeated game that starts under incomplete
information. In each constituent game, the countries decide on whether or not to
abate and, in the affirmative, on how much to abate. We solve this game for its
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Depending on prior beliefs, the discount factor, and
the anticipated level of cooperation in the potential complete information sub-
Ž . Ž .game, we obtain the following outcomes. i For high discount factors, or ii low
discount factors but pessimistic prior beliefs, the inclusion of incomplete informa-
tion has no impact on the pattern of abatements. Otherwise the game becomes a
war of attrition, including a potential outcome in which one country bears the
burden of abating forever and another involving delay until first abatement is
observed.
We can reformulate these predictions in light of the interpretations of the
discount factor mentioned in Section IV. Our results imply that if the countries
interact frequently or if abatement strategies can be modified within short time
periods, then the inclusion of incomplete information does not affect the pattern of
abatements. With shorter periods, deviations in the complete information subgame
are quickly punished, hence are more costly. As a result, higher payoffs can be
supported by cooperative subgame-perfect strategies, which in turn induce high-
valuation countries to reveal their types immediately. It is only when the length of
a period is sufficiently high that the outcome depends critically on the distribution
of prior beliefs. Immediate switching to the cooperative phase is more likely if,
given the rate of time preference and length of periods, the countries are almost
certain that the abatement game will never be interrupted, for instance, by
international political events. On the other hand, a sufficiently high probability of
interruption can lead to a war of attrition.
The overall game has an interesting alternative interpretation; it can be thought
of as a model of negotiations and agreements on abatements, starting under
bilateral incomplete information. An agreement can be defined as a phase of our
overall game such that the PBE participation strategies are pure and remain
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constant. Since defection forever is not an equilibrium outcome, we have three
potential types of agreements, which correspond precisely to the equilibria of the
subgames AA, AN, and NA: An agreement between two type-H countries is
reached either through mutual or unilateral concessions on abatements. Note that
the equilibria of the subgames AA, AN, and NA are perfect, hence the correspond-
ing agreements are self-enforcing with endogenized payoffs. With this interpreta-
tion, the paper offers a theory of international negotiations over bilateral emission
Ž .reductions with predictions Propositions 2, 4, and 5 as to which country is more
likely to make a larger concession and whether or not delay will occur.
There are two important lines along which the paper should be extended. First,
the model should be adapted to accommodate any number of countries. This seems
to be a difficult task in an infinitely repeated game played under multilateral
incomplete information. Another complication with more than two countries arises
Ž .if abatement strategies are not observable this adds another source of uncertainty .
Second, the level of pollution can be included as a state variable as in Dockner and
w xLong 4 who study a differential game under complete information. If the level of
pollution can increase unboundedly in the absence of abatements, type-H countries
would be more vulnerable, and hence would have more incentives to start abating
unilaterally. Besides this minor and predictable modification in the outcome, we do
not expect any qualitative impact on our main results. But this conjecture has to be
verified in a formal model.
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